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ALiENs-NATURAIZATION-RIGHT OF APPEAL. The petitioner applied to the
city court of Meriden, Connecticut, for citizenship. The petition was denied and
he appealed. The United States intervened and moved to dismiss the appeal,
on the ground that the city court was pro tanto a Federal agent, and that no
appeal had been provided for by the Naturalization Act. Act of June 29, 19o6
(34 Stat. at L. 596). Held, that the appeal should be allowed. In re Fordiani
(1923, Conn.) 98 Conn.
It is now well settled that no appeal lies from a hearing on naturalization
before a federal court. United States v. Dolla (igio, C. C. A. 5th) 177 Fed. ioi;
United States v. NYugenbauer (igii, C. C. A. 3d) 221 Fed. 938. The United
States may nevertheless bring an independent suit to cancel any certificate obtained
by fraud or misrepresentation. Sec. 15, Act of June 29, 19o6, supra. Such
action is not considered an appeal. United States v. Simon (igog, C. C. D. Mass.)
17o Fed. 680; Johannessen v. United States (1911) 225 U. S. 227, 32 Sup. Ct
613; United States v. Giisberg (1916) 243 U. S. 472, 37 Sup. Ct. 422. Where
the petition is brought to a state court there is conflict. One view advanced is
that when such court assumes jurisdiction it acts in the capacity of a federal
agent and therefore no appeal lies. State v. Superior Court (1913) 75 Wash.
239, 134 Pac. 916; In re Wilkie (1922, Calif.) 2o8 Pac. 144. The majority view,
and the one adopted by the instant case, contends that the right of appeal still
exists. United States v. Gerstein (1918) 284 Ill. 174, 119 N. E. 922; United
States v. Breen (1909) 135 App. Div. 824, 12o N. Y. Supp. 304; United States v.
Daly (19o9) 32 App. D. C. 525. Although in the latter cases the government
has always been the appellant, the principle should also operate in favor of the
petitioner. The government is under no duty to confer citizenship. United
States v. Shanahan (1916, E. D. Pa.) 232 Fed. 16q. But when a Naturalization
Act is passed, the applicant by conforming to its requirements acquires a right.
In re Fordiani, supra. The state court in exercising jurisdiction adopts exclu-
sively its own method of procedure. Thus the hearing is judicial in nature.
State v. District Court (192i) 6i Mont. 427, 202 Pac. 387; United States v.
Hrasky (1909) 240 Ill. 560, 88 N. E. 1O31. And the decision of the court is a
judgment which cannot be attacked collaterally. Re O'Sullivan (i9o9) 137 Mo.
App. 214, 117 S. W. 651; Rockland v. Hurricane Isle (igog) io6 Me. 169, 76 At.
286. Nor can the court's discretion be questioned in a federal court. In re
Norman (1919, D. Mont.) 256 Fed. 543. There seems to be no ground, therefore,
for assuming that the state court should be considered a federal agency merely
for the purposes of naturalization when it follows its own procedure in all
other respects. As the right of appeal is merely an incident of such procedure,
the instant decision is sound.
BILLS AND NoTvs-CHECKs-REvocABiLiTy OF CERTIFICATION.-A trade accept-
ance was accepted payable at the defendant bank, and there certified when pre-
sented by the indorsee of the drawer. The defendant, claiming mistake, gave
notice of revocation and refused to pay. The only deposits of the acceptor sub-
ject to draft in this manner were insufficient to meet the present acceptance.
But the total deposits were sufficient. After revocation these were applied to
meet notes of the acceptor's held by the bank. Held, that since the bank would
have violated no duty to its depositor by paying the draft and reimbursing itself
from such of its deposits as might be required, the certification could not be
revoked. National Bank of Commerce v. Baltimore Commercial Bank (1922,
Md.) i18 Atl. 855.
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Making an acceptance payable at a bank is equivalent to the acceptor's order
on the bank to pay the same. N. I. L. sec. 87 (Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, sec. 5899,
contra) ; Baldwin's Bank v. Smith (1915) 215 N. Y. 76, 1O9 N. E. 138. Certifi-
cation of such order, as of a check, would be equivalent to acceptance. N. I. L.
sec. 187; see Riverside Bank v. First Nat. Bank (1896, C. C. A. 2d) 74 Fed. 276.
An acceptor is bound to know the state of his drawer's account. N. I. L. sec.
62. And there can be no revocation after delivery. Trent Tile Co. v. Fort Dear-
born Nat. Bank (1892) 54 N. J. L. 33, 23 Atl. 423. Or even, apparently, after
notification. N. I. L. sec. 191. If payment is made without acceptance, there
can be no recovery for mistake of fact as to the sufficiency of the drawer's funds
or as to his having stopped payment. Citizens' Bank v. Schwarechild & Sulz-
berger Co. (19o9) iog Va. 539, 64 S. E. 954; Nat. Bank of N. J. v. Berrall
(19o4) 7o N. J. L. 757, 5& AtI. 189. Various reasons have been assigned: (i)
lack of privity between the payer and payee; (2) the desirability of closing
transactions at a definite time; (3) lack of true mistake, the bank being free
to refuse payment; (4) helplessness of the payee in guarding against the occur-
rence; (5) the policy of putting the risk upon banks. Citizens" Bank v. Sul-
berger, supra. Certification is in legal effect the bank's contract to keep the
account "good." Willets v. Phoenix Bank (1853, N. Y. Super. Ct.) 2 Duer, 121.
When procured by the payee, it has the effect of discharging the drawer, being
thus a novation. First Nat. Bank v. Leach (1873) 52 N. Y. 350; N. I. L. sec.
188. The effect is similar to that of a cashier's check or bank note. See Willets
v. Phoenix Bank, supra. It is said that at common law revocation for mistake
was possible before loss to the holder. In the upper courts only one decision
to this effect has been found. Second Nat. Bank v. Western Nat. Bank (1879)
51 Md. 128 (following a dictum in Irving Bank v. Wetherald (1867) 36 N. Y.
335); see Mt. Morris Bank v. Twenty-third Ward Bank (19o2) 172 N. Y. 244,
64 N. E. 81o; Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Toler (1892, Sup. Ct.) 65 Hun, 187, 19
N. Y. Supp. 975, aff'd 138 X. Y. 675, 34 N. E. 515; Security Savings & Trust
Co. v. King (1914) 69 Or. 228, 138 Pac. 465. Lower court decisions in accord:
Dillaway v. Northwestern Nat. Bank (1899) 82 Ill. App. 71; Baldinger v. Mfrs'.
Citizens' Trust Co. (1915, Sup. Ct.) 156 N. Y. Supp. 445; see (1917) 29 HAv. L.
REv. 549. The Negotiable Instruments Law has incorporated Price v. Neal in
sec. 62. See (1922) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 522. The aim of the Negotiable
Instruments Law to do away with these peculiar dicta on revocation of certifi-
cation as distinguished from acceptance seems clear. See. 187. As for the
instant case, the reason for the existence of a power to revoke being inability
to charge the drawer, the old rule would in any case fall with its reason. More-
over the overdraft having induced the error may properly be regarded as a
special order countermanding general orders to pay out of particular funds only.
CARRIERS-MISQUOTATION OF INTERSTATE RATSs.-The plaintiff ordered an inter-
state shipment of fruit diverted to a new point upon the statement of the defend-
ant's agent that the "through" rate would be charged. At the new destination
the defendant charged the scheduled "local" rate as fixed by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, which was in excess of the rate previously quoted. The
plaintiffs refused to pay these charges, and the defendant sold the fruit. In a
suit for conversion the plaintiff contended that the defendant was estopped from
collecting more than the quoted rate. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the
plaintiff could not recover. Willson v. American Ry. Express Co. (1922, App.
Div.) 197 N. Y. Supp. 6oo.
The question involved does dot concern estoppel but rather a phase of the
limitation of free contract between carrier and shipper. The power to fix trans-
portation rates has been given to. the Interstate Commerce Commission. Act of
Feb. 4, 1887 (24 Stat. at L. 379); Taenzer v. Chicago, R. I., & P. Ry. (1911,
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C. C. A. 6th) 191 Fed. 543. A misquotation will not excuse either the collection
or the payment of the scheduled rate approved by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, as the effect would be to charge less than the required rate. Louisville
& Nashville Ry. v. Maxwell (1915) 237 U. S. 94, 35 Sup. Ct. 494; St Louis .
Mt. & S. Ry. v. Wolf (i911) ioo Ark. 22, 139 S. W. 536; Atchison, Topeka &
Sante F6 Ry. v. Robinson (914) 233 U. S. 173, 34 Sup. Ct. 556; 38 L; R. A.
(N. s.) 351, note. Redress is not allowed the shipper for a misquotation of rates
as it would open the way to rebates and discriminations. Texas & Pacific Ry. v.
Mugg (1905) 202 U. S. 242, 26 Sup. Ct 628; Poor v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Ry. (19o7) 12 I. C. C. 418; Barnes, Freight Rates and Charges (1922)
sec. 6o5 (a). But Congress has imposed a penalty accruing to the United States
for such misquotations. Act to Regulate Commerce, Amendment of June 18,
1910 (36 Stat. at L. 539, 548). But where the rules for the determination of the
rates are ambiguous, or require a construction for their application to particular
facts, and no construction has been approved, the carrier might be held to the
interpretation of its agent. See Chicago, R. I., & P. Ry. v. Dodson (igio) 25
Okla. 822, 832, 1o7 Pac. 921, 925. The dissenting opinion adopts this suggestion
but fails to demonstrate the ambiguity of the rules in the instant case. The
decision of the majority is in accord with the prevailing tendency to restrict the
field of free bargaining between carriers and shippers. Boston & Maine Ry. v.
Hooker (1914) 233 U. S. 97, 34 Sup. Ct. 526; American Ry. Express Co. v.
Lindenburg (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 2o6; see (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
500.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POWER OF COURTS To RrVIw ADMINISTRATrvE DEci-
SIONs.-The Immigration Act provides that the decision of the Secretary of
Labor shall be final in any deportation case. Act of Feb. 5, 1917 (39 Stat. at L.
874, 89o). And it empowers the Commissioner General of Immigration, under
direction of the Secretary of Labor, to establish rules and regulations for carry-
ing out its provisions. Ibid. at p. 892. One of the rules thus established provides
that the alien shall be allowed to inspect the warrant of arrest and all the evidence
on which it was issued. The relator was ordered deported for a violation of the
act based on his own admission. The procedure prescribed had been disregarded.
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus he was discharged. Held, that the Dis-
trict Court had jurisdiction to review the case. Sibray v. United States (1922,
C. C. A. 3d) 282 Fed. 795.
Aliens have the constitutional right under the Fifth Amendment not to be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Colyer v.
Skeffington (192o, D. Mass.) 265 Fed. 17; Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) i18 U. S.
356, 6 Sup. Ct. lo64. Thus the decisions of administrative tribunals are review-
able where the proceedings appear to have been unfair, or the requirements of
due process have not been observed. Chin Yow v. United States (I9o8) 208
U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct 2O1; Gegiow v. Uhl (1915) 239 U. S. 3, 36 Sup. Ct. 2; Ex parte
Radivoeff (1922, D. Mont.) 278 Fed. 227. As pointed out in the Chin Yow case,
the cause is not remanded by such proceedings, but is finally determined by the
court of review. In England under similar acts, the findings of administrative
bodies are not reviewable. See (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 426. The instant
case prescribes a sensible limitation on the scope of power of an administrative
body, and illustrates the tenacity with which the courts cling to their jurisdic-
tion over legal questions. For a discussion as to the extent of recognition given
to decisions of administrative bodies, see Grimm, Administrative Determninations
(1918) 3 ST. Louis L. REv. 14o.
CONTRACTS-REAL ESTATE BROERs-ExcLusivE AGENcY.-The defendant gave
the plaintiff, a real estate broker, the exclusive privilege to sell certain property
for an indefinite time. The plaintiff advertised and listed the property, and
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eighteen days later produced a prospective purchaser. The defendant had
previously sold the property through another agent, without having notified the
plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for his commission. Held, that the plaintiff could
recover without being compelled to show that the prospective purchaser was able
to buy. Robertson v. Wilson (1922, Wash.) 2o9 Pac. 841.
The ordinary real estate brokerage agreement is merely an offer, and can be
accepted only by complete performance, that is, by presenting a purchaser ready,
willing, and able to buy at a time before the revocation of the offer. Cadigan v.
C rabtree (igoi) 179 Mass. 474, 61 N. E. 37; Colburn v. Seymo-ur (1904) 32 Colo.
430, 76 Pac. io58; Bodine v. Penn Lionber Co. (1917) 128 Ark. 347, 194 S. W.
226. There is a conflict as to whether notice is necessary to revoke, or a sale
through another agent will in itself operate as revocation. Haggart v. Kitg
(i92o) io7 Kan. 75, i9O Pac. 763; United States Farm Land Co. v. Darter (19i9)
42 Calif. App. 292, 183 Pac. 696. But such presentation is essential to the creation
of a binding contract, and constitutes acceptance, consideration, and performance
all in one. An exclusive agency agreement for a fixed time, however, becomes
irrevocable as soon as the broker has performed substantial acts in reliance upon
it. See L. R. A. 1917 E, io4o, note. The theory most often advanced is that
such efforts in themselves constitute consideration and acceptance, and raise a
binding duty on the part of the principal not to revoke or sell through a third party
within the time limited, and to pay the agreed commission in case the broker
performs. Cloe v. Rogers (1912) 31 Okla. :255, II Pac. 2oI; Braniff v. Baier
(1917) IOl Kan. 117, i65 Pac. 816; Hardwick v. Marsh (igio) 96 Ark. 23, 130
S. W. 524; see (9=2) 31 YALE LAW JouaRAL, 674; COMMENTS (1919) 28 ibid.
575. By analogy to similar situations, this result may be justified upon several
theories: (i) There is an implied promise not to revoke in consideration of such
efforts. Elkins v. Board of Cominissio ers (1912) 86 Kan. 305, 12o Pac.. 542;
Page, Contracts (2d ed. 1920) sec. 130. Such promise being normally implied in
fact. (2) There is an implied promise by the broker to use his best efforts to effect
a sale as consideration for the promise of the owner. Cilmore v. Samuels (19o9)
135 Ky. 706, 123 S. W. 271. (3) The owner is bound by estoppel. See Ashley,
Offers Calling for a Consideration Other than a Counter-Promise (igio) 23
HARV. L. REv. 159. (4) After such efforts have been made, the agent's power to
accept becomes, by implied agreement or construction of law, irrevocable. Corbin,
Offer and Acceptance (917) 26 YALE LAw JouRNAL, i69, 187. Only a few
cases require complete performance (presentation of a purchaser ready, willing,
and able to buy) before revocation as a condition precedent to the duty to pay
commission in cases of this type. Alterbach v. Internationale Wolfram Lampen
Aktien Gesellschaft (igio, S. D. N. Y.) 177 Fed. 458; see Wiggins v. Wilson
(1908) 55 Fla. 346, 45 So. ion. Consequently, by showing his exclusive agency
for a fixed time and his efforts thereunder, the broker can here establish a binding
conditional duty on his principal. See Corbin, loc. cit. Sale through another agent
is repudiation and breach, but it is still a condition precedent to the duty of the
defendant to pay damages, for the plaintiff to show either that he had fully
performed, or that he would have performed but for the repudiation which excused
him. Strasbourger v. Leerbarger (1922) 233 N. Y. 55, 134 N. E. 834; Dosch v.
Andrus (19o) iii Minn. 287, 126 N. W. 1o71. To prove that he had performed,
it would be necessary to show presentation of a buyer who was ready, willing, and
able to buy. Colburn v. Sernour, supra. But to prove his own ability to perform
within the time limited, it would not be necessary to show that any particular
buyer was ready, willing, and able. Such proof might be made by evidence of
general market conditions. Blumenthal v. Bridges (19o9) 91 Ark. 212, 12o S. W.
974; McLane v. Maurer (i9o2) 28 Tex. Civ. App. 75, 66 S. W. 693; Hollweg v.
Schaefer Brokerage Co. (192, C. C. A. 6th) 197 Fed. 689. A very small minority
has held that a breach by the owner throws upon him the burden of proving the
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broker's inability, but the reverse is the better rule. See Norilain v. Vanderberg
(1911) 157 Mo. App. 488, 138 S. W. 47. The instant case differs from the above
only in that it is an exclusive agency agreement for an indefinite time, and the
court by implication writes in the wofds "for a reasonable time." Cf. (1918)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 67. But it seems that the instant decision is correct in
holding that ability to buy on the part of the prospective purchaser need not
necessarily be shown if the plaintiff has otherwise established that he is able
to perform and that he would have performed within a reasonable time.
FUTURE INTERESTs-GIFT TO CLASS-CONTINGENT REMAINDER.-A conveyed to
B in fee, but if B died without children then to the other children of A "or, in
case of their death, then to their children share and share alike." A grandchild
of the grantor, after the death of his father attempted to convey his interest by
warranty deed to C and predeceased B. On the death of B without issue, the
plaintiff, as sole heir of C, claimed an undivided interest in the land. Held,
(one judge dissenting) that as the grandchild had but a contingent interest which
failed upon his death before the life tenant the plaintiff could not recover. Deal
v. Wall (1922, Ga.) 115 S. E. 78.
A conveyance or devise of real estate in fee with a proviso that, upon definite
failure of issue, the property shall go to another, creates a determinable fee in
the grantee, and in the second taker an executory interest necessarily contingent.
Pugh v. Allen (192o) 179 N. C. 307, 1O2 S. E. 394; Lee v. Roberson (1921) 297
Ill. 321, 13o N. E. 774. But in the instant case it seems that the executory limita-
tion was a gift to a class comprised of the other children of the grantor or their
children in case of their death before the testator. Prima facie, a gift to persons
who are included and comprehended under some general description and bear a
certain relation to the grantor, or have some common relation to each other, is
a class gift. Blackstone v. Althouse (1917) 278 Ill. 481, 116 N. E. 154; Kings-
bury v. Walter [19O1, H. L.] A. C. 187; Kales, Estates Future Interests (2d ed.
1920) sec. 553 et seq.; L. R. A. i9i8B, 234, note. In the absence of an expression
clearly showing an intention to the contrary the membership of a class is .fixed
at the time the conveyance became effective, whether by deed or will, and here
properly included the three other children who survived the grantor. Himmel v.
Himmel (1920) 294 Ill. 557, 128 N. E. 641; Close v. Benham (1921) 97 Conn.
102, 115 Atl. 626; Ware v. Rowland (1847, Ch.) 2 Phil. 635; 2o A. L. R.
356, note. Thus at the death of B without issue the other three children of the
grantor or the children of any deceased were entitled to equal shares. As one
of the children had died during the lifetime of B, his only child, the grantor of
the plaintiff's predecessor, became entitled to his father's interest. Branton v.
Buckley (1911) 99 Miss. 116, 54 So. 85o. The interest thus taken by the grand-
child of the grantor, since it was contingent on B's death without issue, could
perhaps not be alienated, but upon the death of B without children would pass
by warranty deed under the doctrine of estoppel. Pitzer v. Morrison (1916)
272 Ill. 291, I N. E. 1017; cf. Newlove v. Mercantile Trust Co. (igog) 156
Calif. 657, lO5 Pac. 971; see Freund, Three Suggestions Concerning Future
Interests (1920) 33 HALv. L. REV. 526. In the instant case it seems that the
dissenting opinion, though its reasoning may be open to question, reaches the
correct result.
INSUPANcE-FRFETURE VoR BREACH OF CONDITION-VOID AND VOIDABLE CON-
STRUED.-Under a life insurance policy issued by the defendant, the insured had
the power to withdraw in cash his equity and accrued surplus after ten premiums
had been paid during a fifteen year tontine period. It was provided that the
policy should become "void" on default of any premium, subject however to the
privilege of the insured to demand, within six months, a paid-up policy for a
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lesser amount. After paying six premiums, the plaintiff defaulted and failed
to exercise his privilege within the limited time. The defendant marked the
policy as lapsed, and without notifying the plaintiff credited him with a period
of term insurance which was not provided for by the original policy. After the
expiration of the tontine period, the plaintiff, upon tendering back premiums and
interest thereon,, sought to 'withdraw the equity and surplus which would in due
course have accumulated. Held, that "void" as used in the condition of forfei-
ture meant "voidable"; that the crediting of the plaintiff after his default, with
the period of term insurance, showed an intention to keep the original policy in
force and that the plaintiff could therefore recover under it. New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Lahr (1923, Ind.) 137 N. E. 673.
Under an unqualified stipulation that a breach of condition shall cause an
obligation in a policy to become void, the occurrence of a breach should of
itself totally extinguish such obligation. Home Life and Acc. Co. v. Haskins
(I922, Ark.) 245 S. W. 181; Vance, Insurance (1904) 373. But many cases, of
which the instant one is an example, hold that as a matter of law "void" means
"voidable," i. e., that a breach of condition merely gives the insurer a power to
avoid his undertaking. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. French (1876) 30 Ohio St. 24o;
Ewart, Waiver Distributed (1917) 194. It is recognized that any language in
a policy showing that the parties intended to use "void" as "voidable" will be so
construed. Robinson v. Western Assurance Co. (1914, D. C.) 211 Fed. 747. But
effect will be given to a deliberate choice of a word. Dressler v. Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co. (1921) 1o5 Neb. 66, 181 i. W. 543. Presumptively "void" means
exactly what it connotes, but no absolute meaning can soundly be assigned to it
as a matter of law. The entire contract must be considered. Phoenix Ins. Co.
v. Shulnan Co. (igg) 125 Va. 281, 99 S. E. 605. A similar rule is applied in
determining the meaning of the word in statutes. Wiley v. Wiley (i919, Ind.
App.) 123 N. E. 255. From the report of the principal case, there appears to be
no reason for finding that the insured, after default, had any interest other than
a privilege to claim a smaller paid-up policy, which privilege later expired by its
own limitation. And even assuming that the policy became merely voidable upon
default, it seems difficult to support the conclusion that the gratuitous grant of
term insurance, not provided for by the original policy, showed an intention to
keep the original policy in force. Elms v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. (1921,
Mo. App.) 231 S. W. 653.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-OWNERSHIP OF GROWING CRoPs-PIoRITy OF LIENOR
ovER LANDLORD.-The plaintiff did work on growing crops for one Chung, a
tenant of the defendant company. At the end of his period of employment he
filed notice of a claim of a statutory lien upon the crops. In an action to fore-
close the lien, the defendant answered that it had entered on the premises upon
forfeiture of Chung's lease prior to the filing of the lien, and that consequently
title to the growing crops had passed to the defendant company. Held, that the
plaintiff could foreclose. Paik v. Chung (1923, Wash.) 211 Pac. 729.
The tenant's ownership of growing crops is a legal power by severing them to
make them his personalty. I Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) sec. 263. This
power is lost when the term is brought to an end by re-entry of the landlord for
condition broken, and the ownership in the growing crops passes to the landlord.
Debow v. Colfax (1828) io N. J. L. 128; Myer v. Roberts (19o7) 50 Or. 8I, 89
Pac. lO5i; 2 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1912) 1406, 164o. Thus the pur-
chaser of growing crops before the tenant's default is in no better position than
the tenant. Debow v. Colfax, supra; but see Nye v. Patterson (1877) 35 Mich.
413. Nor is a mortgagee protected against the landlord entering on breach of
condition. Gregg v. Boyd (1893) 69 Hun, 588, 23 N. Y. Supp. gi8.' But the farm
laborer's lien is often made superior to a prior chattel mortgage of the crops
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by statute. Watson v. May (1896) 62 Ark. 435, 35 S. W. 1o; Chapinan v.
Averill Co. (1915) 28 Idaho, 121, 152 Pac. 573. In such a case the vendee of
crops without notice also takes subject to the lien. Powell v. Smnith (1896) 74
Miss. I4, 2o So. 872. In the instant case the court correctly held that a land-
lord succeeding to ownership by forfeiture is in no better position than a mort-
gagee or vendee. The best interests of agriculture are secured by making the
farm laborer's wages surely payable out of the crops, whoever their owner may
be. Similarly the lien of a seed grain note is preferred over an ordinary chattel
mortgage. Endreson v. Larson (19o7) OI Minn. 417, 112 N. W. 628. By the
better view the same rule of policy has often prevailed to give the repairman
a lien superior to that of a prior chattel mortgagee. See (1923) 32 YALE LAiw
JOURNAL, 623.
MORTGAGEs-EJECTME.NT OF MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION AFTER DEFAu1T.-The
defendant sold and conveyed to the plaintiff a tract of land, accepting in return
a bond and mortgage as security for the purchase price, the defendant retaining
possession under a written lease. The plaintiff having defaulted on the mortgage
before the expiration of the lease, the defendant instituted foreclosure proceed-
ings. With this suit pending, the defendant refused to vacate the premises after
the lease had expired, whereupon the plaintiff brought an action of ejectment in
a Magistrate's Court. The defendant contended that he, as mortgagee in posses-
sion after default, could not be ejected until the debt was paid. Held, (two
judges dissenting) that the plaintiff could not recover. Pearce v. Dunn (1923,
S. C.) 115 S. E. 621.
In jurisdictions retaining the common-law theory of a mortgage the right of
a mortgagee in possession after default is well settled. Weathersbee v. Goodwin
(1918) I75 N. C. 234, 95 S. E. 491; Brown v. Loeb (1912) 177 Ala. io6, 58 So.
330. This is true also in those jurisdictions which hold that the mortgagee
acquires a legal title upon default of the mortgagor. Wilson v. Reed (917)
270 MO. 400, I93 S. W. 819; Wells v. Kemnne (1916) 145 Ga. 17, 88 S. E. 562;
Cohn v. Plass (19I5) 85 N. J. Eq. 153, 95 Atl. ion. The problem affords greater
difficulty, however, where the lien theory has been adopted. It has usually been
held that the mortgagee in possession at the time of default may retain such
possession until the debt is paid. Becker v. McRea (19o8) 193 N. Y. 423, 80
N1. E. 463; Stouffer v. Harlam (1903) 68 Kan. 135, 74 Pac. 6Io; La Point v.
Sage (I916) go Vt. 56o, 99 At1. 233. Some of the states that follow this doctrine
require only that the mortgagee's possession be obtained "lawfully" or "right-
fully." Caro v. Wollenberg (1913) 68 Or. 42o, 136 Pac. 866; Burns v. Hiatt
(i9O6) 149 Calif. 617, 87 Pac. 196; Pettit v. Louis (1911) 88 Neb. 496, I29
N. W. IOO5. Others require that the possession be obtained with the assent of
the owner of the legal title. Thus a mortgagee in possession as purchaser under
void foreclosure sale may be ejected. Bilger v. Nimun (912, C. C. A. 9th) 199
Fed. 549; Herman v. Cabinet Land Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 526, 112 N. E. 476.
Although a number of theories as to the basis of the doctrine have been advanced,
probably the most satisfactory one lies in the desire of the courts to suppress
useless litigation. See 3 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 2427; (1916) i5
MICH. L. REV. 58. For a discussion of the development of the doctrine in New
York, where it originated, see (igo8) 8 Col. L. REv. 486.
SALES-BREACH OF WARRANTY-REmEDIES OF BuYER-The plaintiff agreed to
sell the defendant an asphalt mixer, and warranted it as to structure and output.
The defendant agreed to return the machine if defects should develop. The
machine was below the warranted standard, but the defendant retained it, and
used it to complete a paving contract which imposed a penalty for delay beyond
a certain day. In a suit for the purchase price, the defendant counterclaimed
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for damages. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the defendants could recover
on the counterclaim. Austin Co. v. Tillman Co. (1922, Or.) 209 Pac. 131.
A buyer may refuse to accept a chattel not conforming to the contract, but a
retention after delivery with use inconsistent with ownership in the seller con-
stitutes an acceptance. Wolf Co. v. Monarch Refrigerating Co. (I9IX) 252 Ill.
491, 96 N. E. io63; Uniform Sales Act, sec. 48. Such acceptance of itself does
not waive the buyer's remedy for defective performance. Yellow Jacket Co. v.
Tegarden Bros. (I912) io4 Ark. 573, 149 S. W. 518; Hauss v. Surran (1916) 168
Ky. 686, 182 S. W. 927; contra: Patrick v. Norfolk Lumber Co. (19o8) 8I Neb.
267, 115 N. W. 780; see Williston, Sales (I909) secs. 485-489. Several remedies
are available to the buyer for a breach of warranty. He may have.an 'action or
counterclaim for damages, or recoupment in an action for the price. Mondel v.
Steel (841, Exch.) 8 M. & W. 858; Parry Mfg. Co. v. Tobin (igoo) io6 Wis.
286, 82 N. W. 154; Uniform Sales Act, sec. 69; but see Impervious Products Co.
v. Gray (915) 127 Md. 64, 96 Atl. I. There is a sharp conflict as to whether a
breach of warranty also entitles a vendee to rescind an executed contract of sale
in the absence of fraud, where such a power has not been expressly reserved.
Street v. Blay (1831, K. B.) 2 Barn. & Adol. 456; Wirth v. Fawkes (igog) io9
Minn. 254 , 123 N. W. 66r; Klock v. Newbury (i91I) 63 Wash. 153, 114 Pac. 1o32;
Williston, op. cit. sec. 6o8. The parties may, moreover, provide for an exclusive
remedy for breach of warranty. Helvetia Copper Co. v. Hart-Parr Co. (igig)
142 Minn. 74, 171 N. W. 272. But unless the intention to make a given special
remedy exclusive is clear, it will be treated as cumulative and permissive. May-
field v. Richardson Co. (1921) 208 Mo. App. 2o6, 231 S. W. 288; Feeney &
Bremer Co. v. Stone (1918) 89 Or. 36o, 171 Pac. 569. And even where the con-
tract limits the buyer's remedies, a failure on the part of the seller to perform
conditions precedent to the operation of such a limitation defeats the limitation.
Warder v. Robertson (1888) 75 Iowa, 585, 39 N. W. 9o5; Nunn v. Brillhart(1921, Tex. Civ. App.) 23o S. W. 862. In the instant case, the court fairly inter-
preted the provision as to return to apply to defects arising, or discoverable, only
after the machine was tested for use. Substantial performance of the agreement
to deliver a machine as described was then a condition precedent to the operation
of the limitation. Furthermore, it seems that an agreement to return for defects
does not clearly indicate an intent to exclude all other remedies, and should be
construed as cumulative. On either ground the decision of the instant case is
correct.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-STATEMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION IN THE MEMORANDUM-
EVIDENCE OF CusTo.-The plaintiff contracted to sell and the defendant to buy
sugar. The memorandum stated "5o barrels or equivalent, basis 22.50, price
22.50." Subject to necessary substitutions the defendant had the choice of grade
until a certain date, after which the plaintiff had the choice. The plaintiff sued
to recover the difference between the market and contract prices because of the
defendant's refusal to accept the sugar. Held, that since the memorandum did
not state the price, it was within the Statute of Frauds. Franklin Sugar Refining
Co. v. Howell (1922, Pa.) 118 Atl. iog.
Under the Statute of Frauds, where the consideration is agreed upon it must
be stated in the memorandum. Stapleton v. Muscogee Guano Co. (1922, Ga.)
114 S. E. 906; contra: Williams v. Robinson (1882) 73 Me. 186. Where not
agreed upon a reasonable consideration is understood. Hoadly v. McLaine(1834, C. P.) io Bing. 482. In some jurisdictions statutes expressly provide that
the memorandum shall state the consideration. Ala. Code, 1907, ch. go, sec.
4289; Rains v. Patton (1914) 191 Ala. 349, 67 So. 6oo. Other statutes say that
the consideration need not be stated. Ky. Sts. 1915, ch. 27, sec. 47o; Ewing v.
Stanley (1902, Ky.) 69 S. W. 724. Executed consideration need not be specified.
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Sayward v. Gardner (1892) 5 Wash. 247, 31 Pac. 761; Williston, Sales (19o9)
sec. 103. In such a case the phrase "for value received" is enough to satisfy the
statute. Cheney v. Cook (1856) 7 Wis. 413. The consideration may be computed
from the statements made. Tracy v. Aldrich (1921, Mo.) 236 S. W. 347. Also
the memorandum may refer to other writings for its determination. Manufac-
turers' Light & Heat Co. v. Lamp (1921, Pa.) 112 Atl. 679. Parol evidence of
the custom or usage of the trade may be introduced to explain an ambiguous
statement of the consideration. Spicer v. Cooper (1841, Q. B.) i Gale and D.
52; Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Goddard (1852, U. S.) 14 How. 446; see (1921)
3o YALE LAw JOURNAL, 761. In the instant case admittedly 22.50 meant 22Y
cents a pound, but the price of the varying grades was not shown. A reference
to the price-list or proof of a custom of the trade to incorporate it in the contract
would have made the memorandum good. The strict adherence to the usual
rules seems sound.
SURETYSHip-APPEAL BoNDs-LABiLiTy OF SUPRT. WHEN APPEAL is AB3A_-
DoNED .The plaintiff recovered a judgment against the Kansas City Railway
Company. The latter, with intent to appeal, filed a supersedeas bond with the
defendant as surety and served a notice of appeal upon the plaintiff's attorney.
No such notice was ever filed in the higher court. Thereafter the company
abandoned the appeal. The plaintiff sued the defendant on the bond. The latter
contended that there was a failure of consideration because the appeal was never
perfected. Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Tackett v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1923, Kan.) 212 Pac. 357.
The contract of the surety has been generally held to be strictissimi juris.
Kirschbaum. v. Blair (1898) 98 Va. 35, 34 S. E. 895; First National Bank v.
Goodman (1898) 55 Neb. 419, 77 N. W. 757. In some jurisdictions the actual
commencement of the appeal is a condition precedent to the duty of the surety
to pay. Woodle v. Settlemeyer (1914) 71 Or. 25, 141 Pac. 205. But the modern
tendency seems to be toward increasing liberality. Thus where the bondsman
undertakes the duty to pay unless the appellant should "prosecute the appeal with
effect," an abandonment of the appeal, or a failure to prosecute, does not discharge
the surety. Illinois Surety Co. v. Hendrick (1916) 17o Ky. 347, 185 S. W. 1125;
Dry Goods Co. v. Livingston (19ol) 16 Colo. App. 257, 65 Pac. 413. The reason
advanced is that although literally the appeal has not been prosecuted, yet the
principal in the bond has received the consideration stipulated for, that is, a stay
of execution. Healy v. Newton (1893) 86 Mich. 228, 55 N. W. 666; Dry Goods
Co. v. Livingston, supra. And the appeal is prosecuted with effect where a
material part of the judgment is reversed, although the whole may not be.
Schutze v. Dabney (igi8, Tex. Civ. App.) 204 S. W. 342. The same liberality of
construction is applied when the bond is conditioned upon payment of the judg-
ment if it should be "affirmed." Thus failure to perfect the appeal operates as
such affirmance. Jones v. First National Bank (1918, Okla.) 171 Pac. 848;
Calbreath v. Coyne (91o) 48 Colo. 199, lO9 Pac. 428. And the surety is still
bound where, by an agreement made in good faith between the parties to the
suit, the appeal is discontinued. First Nat. Bank v. Stevens Land Co. (1912) 119
Minn. 209, 137 N. W. iioi; Howell v. Alma Mill Co. (1893) 36 Neb. 8o, 54
N. W. 126; contra: Foo Long v. American Surety Co. (895) 146 N. Y. 251, 40
N. E. 73o. The same result obtains where for some reason the appeal is dis-
missed. Grossman v. Cohen (1917) 207 Ill. App. 156; Peck v. Curlee Clothing
Co. (1917) 63 Okla. 61, 162 Pac. 735; contra: Hill v. Keller (1911) 157 Mo.
App. 701, 137 S. W. 573. But the surety is not liable if the appeal is dismissed
because of insufficiency of the appeal bond. Bortree v. Dunkin (1912) 20 Wyo.
376, 123 Pac. 913; Manning v. Gould (1882) 90 N. Y. 476. Where, as in the prin-
cipal case, the appeal is abandoned, the judgment is held to be "affirmed" within
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the meaning of the bond. Champ omier v. Washington (1847) 2 La. 1O;
McConnel v. Swailes (184o, Ill.) 2 Scam. 571. This view coincides with the
modern tendency. The court points out that the surety is not in fact unduly
prejudiced, as he ordinarily has no control over the principal's procedure on
appeal and he is liable even when the appeal is defective or entirely dismissed.
A liberal construction therefore seems desirable.
TORTS-NEGLiENcE-LANDLORD'S LiAumrTY FOR INjURIUs To THIRD PERsONs.-
The plaintiff, a lodger of the defendant's tenant, was injured due to a defect
in a stairway reserved by the defendant for the use of all the tenants. She sued
for damages. Held, that, the plaintiff, being a mere licensee, could not recover.
Fairman v. Perpetual Investment Society [1923, H. L.] i A. C. 74.
The English tendency is to deny relief in cases of this type. In this country
a landlord owes to members of the household and business visitors of the
tenant a duty to keep parts of the premises reserved for all the tenants and
in his control, such as stairways and hallways, reasonably safe for their use.
Beaulac v. Robie (1919) 92 Vt. 27, 1O7 Atl. 107; Miller v. Hooper (1921) 119
Me. 527, 112 At. 256 (tenant's daughter) ; but see Kirby v. Tirrell (1920) 236 Mass.
170, 128 N. E. 28 (duty merely to keep in same condition as at time of letting).
The duty is said to extend to all persons lawfully upon the premises "in the
tenant's right" Karp v. Barton (1912) 164 Mo. App. 389, 144 S. W. 1111
(boarder); Henkel v. Murr (1883, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 31 Hun, 28; see Gleason v.
Boehm (1896) 58 N. J. L. 475, 34 Atl. 886. It is often said to include social
visitors of the lessee. Loucks v. Dolan (1914) 211 N. Y. 237, io5 N. E. 411.
The landlord's liability to third persons is sometimes based on the leasing contract
with the tenant Coupe v. Platt (1899) 172 Mass. 458, 52 N. E. 526. The
sounder tendency, however, and that supported by the weight of authority, bases
the liability on the possession of the premises by the landlord and the fact that
he ought reasonably to expect the plaintiff to use them; so that the court puts
him in the position of an invitee. Brown v. Pepperdine (1921, Calif. App.) 2oo
Pac. 36; Buda v. Dzuretzko (1915) 87 N. 3. L. 34, 93 At. 83; see Gallagher v.
Murphy (1915) 221 Mass. 363, io8 N. E. io8i. It is difficult to reconcile these
decisions with the English rule that one who invites a social guest to his home
owes only the duty to warn him of known, concealed defects. Southcote v.
Stanley (1856, Exch.) i H. & N. 247.
W.LLs-FILPUE OF DONEE TO EXERCISE POWER OF API'OINTMENT.-The testator
devised his residuary estate to the defendant trust company to pay the income
thereof to his wife during her life and in the event of the sale of certain property
during her life, "the proceeds of such sale to be paid over on her death to such
one of my nephews of my own blood as she may by her will direct." The wife
died without exercising the power of appointment and the plaintiff, the sole
heir at law, claimed an intestacy as to such proceeds. Held, (one judge dis-
senting) that an imperative special power in trust was created and that the
court would exercise the power in favor of all of the nephews equally. Water-
inan v. N. Y. Life Ins. & Trust Co. (1922) 204 App. Div. 12, 197 N. Y. Supp. 438.
There is a settled presumption against intestacy, and especially so where there
is a residuary clause. In re Peck's Estate (Ig2, Vt.) 118 Atl. 527; Industrial
Trust Co. v. Gardner (1922, R. I.) 117 AtI. 541; see (1917) 26 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 423. Consequently no intestacy arises where the donee of a power of
appointment dies without exercising it and the donor's intention to benefit an
individual, or a class of individuals, is clear. Hazard v. Bacon (1920, R I.) io8
Atl. 499; Miller v. Brinton (1920) 294 Ill. 177, 128 N. E. 370. The power in the
instant case was limited to appointment among nephews of the donor's own blood.
That clearly indicated an intention to benefit a class, or at least a member of a
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class. It follows that the power is an imperative one, since the fact of its exer-
cise was not left to the donee's discretion. Being imperative, it was a power in
trust which a court of equity would exercise if the donee failed to do so. Cleve-
land, Hewitt & Clark, Probate Law & Practice of Connecticut (1915) 622;
Hazard v. Bacon, supra; McGaughey's Admrs. v. Henry (1954, Ky.) 15 B. Mon.
383; Hughes v. Footner [1921] 2 Ch. 208. It has been suggested that equity
neither compels the exercise of a power by a donee who fails to exercise it, nor
does it exercise it for him, but it declares that there is an implied gift to the
objects of the power. Gray, Powers in Trust (911) 25 HAv. L. REV. 2. In
the principal case, the power given was to pay over to one of the nephews of
the testator's own blood. Since it became impossible to carry out this particu-
lar intention of the testator, the court rather than declare an intestacy, correctly
chose to carry out his general intention in favor of the class. See N. Y. Cons.
Laws, igo9, ch. 52, sec. 16o.
WILLs-REALTY-REMAINDER IN IssuE OF LIFE TENANT NOT IMPLIED FROM
A GIFT OvEa ON DEFINITE FAM.rE OF IssuE.-A life estate in realty was devised
to the plaintiff, with a gift over on her death without issue. There was no
disposition of the remainder in case issue should survive. This action was
brought to quiet title based upon quitclaims from the children of the life tenant
and the devisee of the contingent remainder. Held, that the plaintiff had only
a life estate, and that no remainder to her issue was to be implied. Hunt v.
Miller (1922, Neb.) 19o N. W. 583.
In Nebraska the words "die without issue" import a definite failure of issue.
Schnitter v. McManaman (igog) 85 Neb. 337, 123 N. W. 2%. Where these
words denote an indefinite fdilure the devisee for life takes an estate tail under
the rule in Shelley's Case, usually enlarged to a fee simple by statute. 1 Tiffany,
Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 68; see Beilstein v. Beilstein (1899) 194 Pa. 152,
45 Atl. 73. But the heirs at law are favored and their estate is not divested by
implication unless the inference is inevitable. Bond v. Moore (19o8) 236 Ill.
576, 86 N. E. 386; see 15 L. R. A. (Ni. s.) 73, note; L. R. A. I97A, 1213, note.
Accordingly the English and most of the American courts are unwilling to imply
a remainder in the issue of a life tenant from a gift over on definite failure.
Scale v. Rawlins [1892, H. L.] A. C. 342; Bond v. Moore, supra; COMMENT
(9o9) 3 IL. L. REv. 59o; I Jarman, Wills (6th ed. 191o) 674. There is some
authority to the contrary. Clase v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. (19o9) 195
N. Y. 92, 87 N. E. loo5; Mitter v. The United Hydraulic Cotton Press Co.
(1885) 75 Ga. 540; see Wine v. Markwood (1878, Va.) 31 Gratt. 43; Bentley v.
Kaufman (1877, Pa.) 12 Phila. 435 (personalty). The courts usually seize upon
trifling expressions to support the implication. Kendall v. Kendall (1882) 36
N. J. Eq. 91 (ultimate devisees were the heirs); Hauser v. Craft (19o4) 134
N. C. 319, 46 S. E. 756; Estate of Blake (igio) 157 Calif. 448, io8 Pac. 287;
Kinsella v. Caffrey (186o) ii Ir. Ch. 154 (death of the issue before reaching
majority) ; see Ball v. Phelan (19o8) 94 Miss. 293, 49 So. 956. The conclusion
reached in the instant case is undoubtedly in accord with the prevailing judicial
opinion, but it may be questioned whether the erstwhile important rule favoring
the heir should now be regarded as sufficient to bar the easily implied remainder
to the life tenant's surviving issue.
